A likelihood order is defined over linear subspaces of a finite dimensional Hilbert space. The question arises as to when such an order can be represented by a quantum probability. We introduce a few behaviorally plausible axioms that provide the answer in two cases: pure state and uniform measure. The general problem is answered by using duality-like conditions.
Introduction
According to the subjective approach, probabilities are merely degrees-of-belief of a rational agent. These degrees-of-belief might be indicated by the agent's willingness to bet or take other actions (de-Finetti 1974) . Savage (1954) derives both probabilities and utilities from rational preferences (i.e. that satisfy some putative properties) alone. Such preferences induce, in particular, a preference order over events. That is, an agent who holds rational preferences could indicate which of two events is more likely and moreover, this likelihood order is transitive. Savage's first step is to derive a (finitely additive) probability that represents the likelihood order.
In this paper, we adopt a similar approach and apply it to the quantum framework without going beyond probabilities. While classical probability is defined over subsets (events) of a state space, quantum probability is defined over subspaces of Hilbert space. Furthermore, disjointness of the classical model is replaced by orthogonality.
Formally, let H be a separable Hilbert space. A quantum probability measure m over H assigns a number between 0 and 1 to every closed subspace that satisfies mðA4BÞZ mðAÞC mðBÞ whenever AtB and mðHÞZ 1. Gleason's theorem (1957) states that, if dimðHÞR 3 every quantum measure m is induced by a self-adjoint non-negative operator T with trace 1 in the following way: mðAÞZ trðP A TÞ for every subspace A, where P A is the orthogonal projection over A.
We assume the existence of a likelihood order 6 over subspaces of a given finite-dimensional Hilbert space. The statement 'A is less likely than B in one's eyes' could be understood operationally: one would prefer betting that B occurs than that A occurs (in the corresponding physical measurements).
We say that the likelihood order 6 can be represented by a quantum probability m if A6 B if and only if mðAÞ% mðBÞ. The goal of the line of research presented here is to find plausible properties (axioms, in the jargon of decision theory), preferably rationality-motivated, that ensure that 6 is representable by a quantum probability.
Throughout, it is assumed that 6 possesses three properties. The first is that every subspace is more likely than the zero-dimensional one. The second is that a subspace B is more likely than A if and only if BC C is more likely than AC C , whenever C tA and C tB. That is, adding or deleting a subspace which is orthogonal to both A and B would preserve the likelihood order.
The classical counterpart of the third property is a consequence of the second. However, in the quantum model it has to be explicitly assumed. It states that if B is more likely than A, then the orthogonal complement of B is less likely than that of A.
Savage (1954) also assumes these three axioms but, in order to obtain a representation by a measure, he needs an additional, less motivated, property that concerns with the richness of the state space. This one dictates that the state space could be split into mutually disjoint arbitrarily small (with respect to the likelihood order) subsets. The lack of a quantum counterpart (in the case of a finite-dimensional Hilbert space) of such an Archimedean property makes our study different from that of Savage.
Our main results refer to likelihood orders that can be represented by two types of quantum measures. The first is the most important from a physical point of view. The probabilities of this type are called pure states and are of the form mðAÞZ kP A ðpÞk 2 for some unit vector p 2H. That is, the probability of a subspace A is the length squared of the projection of the vector p. By Gleason's theorem, these measures are the extreme points of the convex set of all quantum probabilities. We characterize the likelihood orders that can be represented by a pure state.
The second main result characterizes the likelihood orders that can be represented by the uniform distribution, defined by mðAÞZ dimðAÞ=dimðHÞ. This is the only quantum measure that obtains a discrete set of values.
We also provide a full characterizing of the partial orders that admit a quantum representation using a duality-like condition, which is less behaviourally justified. However, the general representation problem in terms of axioms that are well motivated from a behavioural viewpoint remains open.
Subjective analysis of quantum probability has been treated in the literature by several authors. Deutsch (1999) assumes that an agent assigns a value to any possible outcome of any possible measurement. Deutsch's analysis hinges on what he calls the 'principle of substitutibility', which is similar to the independence axiom of von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) . Barnum et al. (2000) claimed that Deutsch's proof relies on a tacit symmetry assumption. Deutsch's approach has been defended by Wallace (2003) who argued that the symmetry assumption is in fact a direct consequence of a 'physicality' assumption saying that an agent assigns the same value to two games instantiated by the same physical process. In a complementary paper, Wallace (2005) weakens Deutsch's rationality axioms and replaces the numerical assignments to games with preference order between games. Motivated by the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, the physical state is a primitive in the analysis of Deutsch and Wallace. In contrast, in our analysis the primitive of the model is the logic structure-the structure of subspaces of a Hilbert space, as formulated by von Neumann (1955) . Caves et al. (2002) assume that the agent has degrees-of-belief that determine the odds under which he is willing to take a bet. With the assumption that the agent cannot be attacked by a Dutch book and an additional assumption about 'maximal information', they showed that these degrees-of-belief must be given by a pure state. Pitowsky (2003) assumed that for every possible measurement the agent has a certain probability over the corresponding outcomes. From a few natural axioms, he derives the probabilistic structure over quantum mechanics. The main difference between their approaches and ours is that we do not assume that the agent has quantitative assignments of probabilities (i.e. numerical degrees-ofbelief) to subspaces. Instead, the primitive of our model is a qualitative belief given by the likelihood order. This follows Savage's theory of subjective probability in classical decision theory. The approach is behavioural in nature. An agent chooses one alternative from a finite set of choices and an outside observer records the choices made. When the possible alternatives are bets on outcomes of various measurements, the choices of the decision maker reveal his opinion about which outcome of such measurements is more likely. This partial order (i.e. 'being more likely than') over outcomes of different measurements is the primitive of our study. A representation of the partial order by a quantum probability would mean that the agent acts as if he has quantitative degrees-of-belief that obey the rules of quantum probability.
In the model of Gyntelberg & Hansen (2004) , the primitive is a preference order over acts, which are functions that assign to outcomes of a measurement a consequence. As in Anscombe & Aumann (1963) , the set of consequence is convex. The goal of Gyntelberg & Hansen (2004) is to integrate, by means of a quantum probability and a utility function, a preference order related to the 'small world' to a global picture.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 characterizes the likelihood orders that admit a quantum probability representation in terms of continuity and a duality-like condition, called the cancellation condition. Section 3 introduces the main axioms. Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to the main results: representation by a pure state and by a uniform distribution. Section 6 provides an example of a likelihood order that satisfies the main axioms except for continuity, and cannot be represented by a quantum measure. The paper is concluded with §7 that provides some final comments and open problems.
The cancellation condition and continuity
Let H be a finite dimensional Hilbert space and let 6 be a weak order over linear subspaces of H, that is 6 is reflexive (i.e. for every A, A6 A), transitive (i.e. for every A; B; C, if A6 B and B6 C then A6 C ) and complete (i.e. for every A, B, A6 B or B6 A or both). We call 6 the likelihood order, and when A6 B, we say that B is more likely than A. Denote by w the equivalence relation induced by 6 (i.e. A wB if A6 B and B6 A) and by 3 the corresponding strict order (i.e. A3 B if A6 B and BM A).
(a ) The cancellation condition
Cancellation condition (e.g. Fishburn 1999) is a well-known property of a weak order in the classical framework:
Proposition 2.1. Let 6 be a weak order over subsets of a finite set U. For A 4U, denote by 1 A the indicator function of A. Then there exists an additive probability measure m over U such that A6 B4 mðAÞ% mðBÞ for every A; B 4U if and only if the following conditions hold.
(iii) For every n, if A 1 ; .; A n ; B 1 ; .; B n are subsets of U such that P n iZ1 1 A i Z P n iZ1 1 B i and A i 6 B i for every i, then A i wB i for every i. Definition 2.2. Let m be a quantum probability measure over H. We say that m represents 6, if A6 B4 mðAÞ% mðBÞ for every two subspaces A, B of H.
In the quantum framework, orthogonal projections will replace the indicator functions that appear in lemma 6.1.
Definition 2.3. The likelihood order 6 satisfies the cancellation condition if, for every 2n subspaces of H, A 1 ; .; A n ; B 1 ; .; B n and n positive numbers a i , iZ 1; .; n, if P n iZ1 a i P A i Z P n iZ1 a i P B i and A i 6 B i for every iZ 1; .; n, then A i wB i for every iZ 1; .; n.
(b ) Continuity
The cancellation condition by itself is not sufficient to ensure the existence of a representative measure (e.g. 2 below). Similar examples appear in the classical framework, when one tries to extend proposition 2.1 to an infinite U. In the current framework, in order to obtain a characterization of the likelihood orders that can be represented by a quantum measure, we need the additional assumption that 6 is continuous w.r.t. the natural topology over subspaces.
Let A be a subspace and r be a positive number. Denote by U the unit ball, U Z fx; kxk% 1g. By N r ðAÞ we denote the r-neighbourhood of A restricted to the unit ball, gfV ðx; rÞ; x 2A and x 2U g, where V ðx; rÞ is the ball of radius r around x. For two subspaces A and B, we denote d Ã ðA; BÞZ inffr O 0 : Ah U 3N r ðBÞg and d Ã ðA; BÞZ inffr O 0 : Bh U 3N r ðAÞg. The Hausdorff metric is defined as dðA; BÞ Z maxfd Ã ðA; BÞ; d Ã ðA; BÞg: Note that the topology induced by the Hausdorff metric d Ã ðA; BÞ is the same as the topology induced by the Euclidean distance between the corresponding projections P A and P B .
Definition 2.4. The likelihood order 6 is lower semi-continuous if, for every subspace B, the set of the subspaces A such that A3 B is open with respect to d.
Theorem 2.5. Let 6 be a likelihood order. There exists a quantum probability measure that represents 6 if and only if the following conditions are satisfied.
(i) f0g6 A For every subspace A of H;
(ii) f0g3 H; (iii) 6 is lower semi-continuous; (iv) 6 satisfies the cancellation condition.
Proof. Assume first that 6 is represented by a quantum probability m. Then by Gleason's theorem there exists a non-negative operator T with trace 1 such that mðAÞZ trðP A TÞ for every subspace A of V. In particular, the function A1 mðAÞ is continuous and therefore, the order that it represents is lower semicontinuous. As for the cancellation condition, let A 1 ; .; A n ; B 1 ; .; B n be subspaces such that
.; n, are positive numbers. It follows that
Assume now that the likelihood order 6 satisfies the conditions of theorem 2.5. Consider the finite dimensional Hilbert space of Hermitian operators over H with the inner product of two Hermitian operators S and T being trðSTÞ. Denote 1 CZ ConvfP A KP B ; A3 Bg and DZ spanfP A KP B ; A wBg. From the cancellation condition it follows that C and D are disjoint.
The separation theorem (Rockefeller 1970) ensures that there is a non-zero linear functional on the space of Hermitian operators, represented in this case by some Hermitian operator T, such that trðDTÞZ 0 for every D 2D (since D is a subspace) and trðCTÞR 0 for every C 2C.
Since trðDTÞZ 0 for D 2D, it follows that trðATÞZ trðBTÞ if A wB. Let A3 B. By the definition of C, P A KP B 2C. Due to lower semi-continuity, there exists some neighbourhood U B of B such that A3 B 0 for every B 0 2U and therefore, P A KP B 0 2C for every B 0 2U . Since U contains P A KP B as an interior point it follows that trððP A KP B ÞTÞ is strictly positive. We conclude that T represents 6.
Finally, for every A, trðP A TÞR 0 since f0g6 A. Therefore, T is positive semidefinite. Moreover, since f0g3 H, it follows that trðTÞO 0. Define T 0 Z T=trðTÞ. We obtain that 6 is represented by mðAÞZ trðT 0 AÞ, T 0 is positive semidefinite and trðT 0 ÞZ 1, as desired. &
The cancellation condition (even in the classical framework) is difficult to justify. It is desirable to derive a probability representation of a likelihood order over linear subspaces from more plausible assumptions.
de-Finetti's and other axioms
The most natural condition is de-Finetti's. When applied to classical probability it states that if C is disjoint of Ag B, then B is preferred to A iff Bg C is preferred to Ag C . In the quantum framework, it takes following form.
de-Finetti's axiom. For every linear subspaces A; B; C of H, if AtC and BtC , then A6 B iff AC C 6 BC C .
In the classical framework, it easily follows from de-Finetti's axiom that if A6 B, then B c 6 A c . In the quantum framework, we need to require it explicitly.
Negation. For every two linear subspaces
As illustrated by the following example there might be weak orders that satisfy de-Finetti's axiom and not negation.
Example 3.1. Let H be R 2 . Any monotonic (w.r.t. set inclusion) weak order on H satisfies de-Finetti's axiom but it might not satisfy negation. Let d 0 be such a weak order. As for a higher dimensional Hilbert space, let H be R 3 . Let p be the northern pole of the unit ball, E be the equator, and define mðuÞZ jhp; uij 2 for any unit vector u. We will also need the obvious assumption that any subspace is as preferred as the zero-dimensional one. Formally, Monotonicity. For every subspace A of H, f0g6 A.
Note that monotonicity and de-Finetti's axiom together imply that if A 4B then A6 B for every pair A, B of subspaces. Thus, 6 is monotonic with respect to set inclusion.
In the sequel, we will say that a weak order 6 satisfies the standard assumptions, if it satisfies de-Finetti's axiom, negation and monotonicity.
Do the standard assumptions guarantee that 6 can be represented by a measure? The following is a counterexample. The lexicographic order cannot be represented by a measure since it lacks the following property:
Separability. There is a countable set of subspaces, A, such that for any two subspaces B and C such that B3 C , there is A 2A that satisfies B6 A6 C .
As indicated by Debreu (1954) , separability is necessary for 6 in order to be represented by a real function (not necessarily a measure).
Pure states in R 3
The most important probabilities from the physical point of view are those of the form mðAÞZ kP A ðpÞk 2 for some unit vector p 2A. These distributions are sometimes called pure states. It follows from Gleason's theorem that pure states are the extreme points of the convex set of quantum probabilities. From a decision theoretic point of view, pure states correspond to situations of, where there exists a maximal measurement (i.e. a complete set of orthogonal one-dimensional subspace) whose outcome the agent can predict with certainty (see Caves et al. (2002) for a more detailed discussion).
It is clear that if m is a pure state and 6 is the induced likelihood order, then the one-dimensional subspace spanned by p is equivalent (under w) to H. In this section, we prove the inverse statement. We say that 6 is non-trivial if there exists a subspace A such that f0g3 A. The proof closely follows the proof of Gleason's theorem in Cooke et al. (1985) .
Theorem 4.1. Let 6 be a weak order over subspaces of a finite dimensional real-Hilbert space that satisfies the standard assumptions and separability. Assume that there exists a one-dimensional subspace P such that P wH. Let p be a unit vector in P. If 6 is non-trivial, then 6 is represented by the pure state mðAÞZ kP A ðpÞk 2 .
Proof. Let E be the orthogonal complement of P Z spanfpg. By negation, since P wH it follows that E wf0g. Let A be a subspace of H, A 0 be A 0 Z Ah E and A 1 be the one-dimensional subspace of H that is spanned by P A ðpÞ (the orthogonal projection of p over A). Then, since A 0 3E, it follows from monotonicity that A 0 w0. Since A 1 tA 0 and AZ A 1 C A 0 , it follows from de-Finetti's axiom that A wA 1 . Thus, the likelihood order 6 is determined by its restriction to one-dimensional subspaces. Moreover, since mðAÞZ mðA 1 Þ, it is sufficient to prove that the likelihood order over one-dimensional subspaces is represented by m. Slightly abusing notation, we will identify a unit vector u in H with the one-dimensional subspace spanned by u. With this convention, for every unit vector u, mðuÞZ jhp; uij 2 .
Let u, v be two unit vectors. We need to show that u6 v iff jhp; uij 2 % jhp; vij 2 . By looking at the three-dimensional space H uv spanned by p; u; v, with its twodimensional subspace H uv h E we can assume w.l.o.g. that dim HZ 3. In this case, the theorem will follow directly from the following proposition. Let S 2 be the unit sphere in R 3 . We say that 6 is uniform if all the one-dimensional subspaces are equivalent. & Proposition 4.2. Let 6 be a weak order over R 3 that satisfies the standard assumptions, and such that the restriction of 6 to one-dimensional subspaces is separable. Assume that 6 is not uniform and it attains its minimum over S 2 at m. Furthermore, assume that there exists a two-dimensional subspace E such that m wu for every u 2E. Let p 2S 2 such that ptE. Then, for every pair u; v 2S 2 , u6 v iff jhp; uij 2 % jhp; vij 2 .
Proof of proposition 4.2. The proof of the proposition is broken into five claims. As usual, we identify elements of S 2 with their corresponding onedimensional subspaces. & Claim 4.3. Let q; r 2S 2 be such that q6 r. If q 0 and r 0 are, respectively, the orthogonal complements of q and r in the plane spanfq; rg, then r 0 % q 0 .
Proof. Let n 2S 2 such that ntspanfq; rg. Then q t Z spanfn; q 0 g and r t Z spanfn; r 0 g. By negation, r t 6 q t . By de-Finetti's axiom, r 0 6 q 0 . & Claim 4.4. Let u 1 ; u 2 2S 2 be orthogonal vectors such that u 1 wu 2 wm. If u 2spanfu 1 ; u 2 g, then u wm.
Proof. Note that u 2 is the orthogonal complement of u 1 in spanfu 1 ; u 2 g. Let u 0 be the orthogonal complement of u in spanfu 1 ; u 2 g. Then u 1 wm6 u 0 . By claim 4.3, u6 u 2 wm. Since m6 u, it follows that u wm. & Claim 4.5. Assume that there exists an orthogonal triple u 1 ; u 2 ; u 3 such that m wu 1 wu 2 wu 3 . Then, 6 is uniform.
Proof. Let v 2S 2 . Then there exists u 2spanfu 1 ; u 2 g such that v 2spanfu; u 3 g. By claim 4.4, u wm. But utu 3 and therefore, again by claim 4.4, v wm. & For q 2S 2 , we denote by qðp; qÞ the angle between p and q. Thus 0% qðp; qÞ% p and cos qðp; qÞZ hp; qi. Let N p Z fq 2S 2 j0! qðp; qÞ! p=2g be the northern hemisphere relative to p, and E p Z fq 2S 2 jqðp; qÞZ p=2gZ E h S 2 be the equator relative to p. Let q 2N p . Among the great circles which pass through q, there is a unique one that intersects E p in vector x orthogonal to q. We follow Gleason (1957) and denote this circle by EWðqÞ. Note that q is the northern most point in EWðqÞ and that EWðqÞ is tangent to the latitude circle of q. We will need the following lemma, that appears in Piron (1976) (see also Cooke et al. 1985 ).
Piron's lemma. Let q; r 2N p such that qðp; qÞ! qðp; rÞ; then there exists a finite sequence qZ q 0 ; q 1 ; .; q n Z r of points in N p such that q iC1 2EWðq i Þ.
Claim 4.6. Under the assumption of theorem 4.1, if q; r 2N p and mðrÞ! mðqÞ, then r 3 q.
Proof. Note that mðqÞO mðrÞ iff qðp; qÞ! qðp; rÞ. Let q 2N p and q 1 2EWðqÞ. Let q 0 1 2EWðqÞ be the orthogonal complement of q 1 in the plane of EWðqÞ, and q 0 2E p be the orthogonal complement of q in EWðqÞ. Since q 0 wm6 q 0 1 , it follows from claim 4.3 that q 1 6 q. Moreover, q 1 wq only if q 0 1 wm. By induction it follows from Piron's lemma that r 6 q. Furthermore, r wq only if there exists z 2N p such that z wm. We prove that in this case 6 is uniform, which is excluded by assumption. This will complete the proof.
Note that for every y such that qðp; zÞ! qðp; yÞ! pKqðp; zÞ, m6 y6 z wm. Thus, all the vectors in the band below z are equivalent to m. We now show that one can find another point p 0 , such that x 0 wm for every x 0 2E p 0 and qðp 0 ; zÞZ 1 2 qðp; zÞ, and thus obtaining a wider band. By iterating this argument one can get wider and wider bands until one obtains a band that is wide enough to contain three orthogonal vectors. By claim 4.5, it would imply that 6 is uniform.
Let p 0 be a point in spanfp; zg for which qðp; p 0 ÞZ qðp 0 ; zÞZ 1 2 qðp; zÞ. It follows that, for every x 0 2E p 0 , 3 2 qðp; zÞ! qðp; x 0 Þ! pK 3 2 qðp; zÞ. Thus, E p 0 is entirely contained in the band defined by p and z and therefore, E p 0 wm. & Claim 4.7. If q; r 2N p and mðqÞZ mðrÞ, then q wr.
Proof. We know from claim 4.6 that for q; r 2N p such that mðqÞ! mðrÞ, r 3 q. Now suppose that there exist, for some a, 0! a! p 2 , vectors q 0 ; r 0 2N p such that q 0 3 r 0 and mðq 0 ÞZ mðr 0 ÞZ a. Let QZ fq 2S 2 ; mðqÞZ a; q3 r 0 g and RZ fr 2S 2 ; mðrÞZ a; q 0 3 rg. Then Qg RZ fz 2S 2 ; mðzÞZ ag and therefore, at least one of the sets Q, R must be uncountable. Assume w.l.o.g. that Q is uncountable. For every q 2Q, let q 0 ; r 0 be the orthogonal complements of q; r 0 , respectively, in spanfq; r 0 g. It follows from claim 4.3 that r 0 3 q 0 . Notice moreover, that mðq 0 ÞZ mðr 0 ÞZ 1KaKmðnðqÞÞ, where nðqÞ 2S 2 is orthogonal to spanfq; r 0 g. Since qðp; nðqÞÞZ cos ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi ffi mðnðqÞÞ p increases as q approaches r 0 along the latitude circle of r 0 , we get uncountable set of pairs ðr 0 ; q 0 Þ such that mðr 0 ÞZ mðq 0 Þ, but r 0 3 q 0 with different values of m for different pairs. This, together with claim 4.6 contradicts separability. & From claims 4.6 and 4.7 it follows that mðqÞ% mðrÞ iff q6 r and therefore, the proof of proposition 4.2 is complete.
Back to the proof of theorem 4.1. By assumption, 6 is non-trivial. Therefore, there exists a subspace A which is strictly more likely than f0g. Suppose that A is spanned by the orthogonal vectors u 1 ; .; u k .
Claim 4.8. At least one u i is strictly more likely than f0g.
Proof. Otherwise, u i wf0g for every iZ 1; .k. By de-Finetti's axiom spanfu 1 ; u 2 g wspanfu 2 g wf0g. By successively adding the u i 's and by using de-Finetti's axiom one obtains that A wf0g, in contradiction with the assumption. & By claim 4.8 we can assume that there is a vector x 2S 2 such that x _ f0g. Let y 2spanfx; pgh E. Since y 2E, y wf0g. Furthermore, ytp. Let x 0 be the orthogonal complement of x in spanfx; pg. Since x 0 _ y, by claim 4.3 x 6 p. As 6 is an order, f0g3 x 6 p and thus, f0g3 p. This implies that 6, when restricted to H uv , is not uniform, as assumed by proposition 4.2. This enables us to use this proposition in order to complete the proof of theorem 4.1 Remark 4.9. No sort of continuity is assumed in theorem 4.1. Nevertheless, 6 is represented by a measure and is therefore continuous.
The uniform measure
The only quantum probability measures over a finite dimensional Hilbert space H which receives discrete values is given by the uniform measure, mðAÞZ dimðAÞ=dimðHÞ. It turns out that this is the case characterized by the property that all one-dimensional subspaces are equally likely. Formally:
Proposition 5.1. Let 6 be a weak order over subspaces of a finite dimensional Hilbert space that satisfies de-Finetti's axiom. If all one-dimensional subspaces are equivalent, then either 6 is trivial (i.e. f0g wA for every subspace A of H) or 6 is represented by the uniform measure.
Proof. Assume that every one-dimensional subspace is equivalent to some onedimensional subspace, say, m. If A 1 ; A 2 are two-dimensional such that A 1 h A 2 is one-dimensional, we can assume that A 1 Z spanfa 0 ; a 1 g and A 2 Z spanfa 0 ; a 2 g where a 0 ta 1 and a 0 ta 2 . Since a 1 wa 2 wm we get, by de-Finetti's axiom, that A 1 wA 2 . If A 1 h A 2 Z f0g, we can find a two-dimensional subspace A 0 such that A 1 h A 0 and A 2 h A 0 are one-dimensional. Therefore, A 1 wA 0 wA 2 . Thus all twodimensional subspaces are equivalent. By a similar argument, two subspaces of the same dimension are equivalent.
Finally, if f0g wm, it follows by de-Finetti's axiom that f0g wH. If 03 m, then again by de-Finetti's axiom, if Atm and A 0 Z AC m then A3 A 0 . Using the equivalence of two subspaces with the same dimension, it follows that if dimðA 0 ÞZ dimðAÞC 1, then A3 A 0 and therefore, 6 is represented by mðAÞZ dimðAÞ=dimðHÞ. &
The following non-trivial fact about quantum probabilities follows from Gleason's theorem.
Proposition 5.2. Let H be a finite-dimensional Hilbert space and m be a quantum probability over H. Assume that there exist one-dimensional subspaces (not necessarily orthogonal) u 1 ; .; u n of H such that HZ u 1 C .C u n and mðu 1 ÞZ .Z mðu n Þ% mðxÞ for every one-dimensional subspace x of H. Then, m is the uniform measure.
We show that this proposition is a consequence of the standard assumptions, with the additional assumption that 6 is continuous over one-dimensional subspaces.
Definition 5.3. The likelihood order 6 is continuous over one-dimensional subspaces if for every unit vector v the sets fu; u3 vg and fu; v3 ug are open.
We note that if 6 is continuous over one-dimensional subspaces then its restriction to one-dimensional subspaces is also separable. Indeed, let D 4S 2 be a countable dense set w.r.t. the Euclidean topology of S 2 . For every u; v 2S 2 such that u3 v, let U Z fu 0 2S 2 ju3 u 0 g and V Z fv 0 2S 2 jv 0 3 vg.
We state the result in R 3 . It can easily be extended to every finite-dimensional Hilbert space.
Theorem 5.4. Let 6 be a weak order over R 3 that satisfies the standard assumptions. Assume that 6 is continuous over one-dimensional subspaces. If u 1 ; u 2 ; u 3 is a basis (not necessarily orthogonal) that satisfies u 1 wu 2 wu 3 wm, where m is a minimum of 6, then x wm for every x 2S 2 .
The theorem is proved in a few steps. Denote by M a maximum of 6.
Claim 5.5. Let u; v 2S 2 such that u wm and v wM . Let u 0 ; v 0 be the orthogonal complements of u, v in spanfu; vg, respectively. Then, u 0 wM and v 0 wm.
Proof. Since m wu6 v 0 , it follows from claim 4.3 that v6 u 0 . But v wM and M is a maximum. Therefore, u 0 wM . By a similar argument v 0 wm. & Claim 5.6. If u 1 ; u 2 2S 2 such that u 1 tu 2 and m wu 1 wu 2 , then either all onedimensional subspaces are equivalent or 6 is represented by a pure state.
Proof. Let E Z spanfu 1 ; u 2 g. By claim 4.4, u wm for every u 2E. By proposition 4.2, either 6 is trivial or 6 is represented by a pure state. & Claim 5.7. If u 1 ; u 2 2S 2 such that u 1 sGu 2 , M wu 1 wu 2 and ptu 1 ; u 2 , then p wm.
Proof. Let x 2N p be such that x wm and qðp; xÞ is minimal. If x sp then x cannot be orthogonal to both u 1 and u 2 . Assume, therefore, w.l.o.g. that hx; u 1 i s0. Let u 1 be the orthogonal complement of u 1 in the plane spanfx; u 1 g. By claim 5.5, u 0 1 wm. Moreover, qðp; u 0 1 Þ! qðp; xÞ, since x 2EW ðu 0 1 Þ. This contradicts the choice of x. It therefore follows that xZp, meaning that p wm. & Claim 5.8. If m and M are any minimal and maximal elements in S 2 and m3 M (i.e. 6 is not trivial), then mtM .
Proof. Assume the contrary. Let a be the orthogonal complement of m in spanðm; M Þ. By claim 5.5, a wM . Let p satisfy ptM and pta. By claim 5.7, p wm. However, since m 2spanðM ; aÞ, ptm. Therefore, it follows from claim 5.6 that 6 is represented by a pure state, in which case the claim holds.
&
We now turn to the proof of theorem 5.4. Let M be a maximal element. If 6 is not trivial then from the last claim it follows that M tu i for every i. This is impossible since u 1 ; u 2 ; u 3 are linearly independent and the proof is complete.
Remark 5.9. We do not know whether theorem 5.4 holds true without the assumption that 6 is continuous over one-dimensional spaces. The proof hinges on this assumption in two ways. First, in that 6 attains a minimum and a maximum. Second, in claim 5.7 x is chosen so that among all x wm, qðp; xÞ is minimal. While we could explicitly assume that 6 attains a minimum and a maximum, we could not dispose of the continuity assumption in the proof of claim 5.7.
A counterexample
In this section, we present an example of a separable (though not continuous) weak order over subspaces of R 3 that satisfies the standard assumptions but does not admit a representation via a quantum measure. We need the following two lemmas.
Lemma 6.1. Let 6 be a weak order over one-dimensional subspaces of R 3 such that for every two-dimensional subspace U of R 3 and all one-dimensional subspaces u, v of U one has u6 v4 v06 u 0 , where u 0 ; v 0 are the orthogonal complements of u, v respectively, in U. Then, 6 can be extended to a weak order over R 3 that satisfies the standard assumptions.
Proof. We define 6 as follows. Let U, V be two subspaces of R 3 . If dimðU Þ! dimðV Þ, then U 3 V . If dimðU ÞZ dimðV ÞZ 2, then U 6 V iff V t 6 U t . Negation is obviously satisfied. As for de-Finetti's axiom, let u, v be two different one-dimensional subspaces and x be the one-dimensional subspace such that xtu; v. Let u 0 ; v 0 be the orthogonal complements of u, v in uC v. Then, ðx C uÞ t Z u 0 and ðx C vÞ t Z v 0 . Since, by the assumption of the lemma v 0 6 u 0 , it follows by definition of 6 that
The second lemma states that if 6 is represented by a probability measure, then the order over one-dimensional subspaces of a fixed two-dimensional subspace U has a very specific form. As usual we identify one-dimensional subspaces with unit vectors. If S 1 is the unit circle of U, the lemma essentially says that either all elements of S 1 are equivalent, or there is a single maximal element x 2S 1 that satisfies y 1 6 y 2 iff y 2 is closer than y 1 to x. Lemma 6.2. Let m be a probability measure over R 3 and 6 the corresponding weak order over subspaces. Let U be a two-dimensional subspace of R 3 . Then, either all one-dimensional subspaces of U are equivalent, or there exists unit vector x 2U such that for every pair y 1 ; y 2 of unit vectors y 1 6 y 2 iff jhx; y 1 ij% jhx; y 2 ij.
Proof. By Gleason's theorem, there exists a positive semidefinite operator T such that mðAÞZ trðP A TÞ. Consider the operator P U TP U . This is a positive semidefinite operator. Its spectral decomposition is of the form
where x; x 0 are orthogonal eigenvectors in U with corresponding eigenvalues a; b such that aC bZ 1. We assume that aR b. It follows that for every unit vector y in U, mðyÞ Z trðP y TÞ Z trðp y P U TP U Þ Z ajhy; xij 2 C bjhy; x 0 ij 2 Z b C ðaKbÞjhy; xij 2 :
Thus, if aZb then all y 2S 2 h U are equivalent. If aOb, then mðyÞ is a monotonic function of jhy; xij. & Example 6.3. Let d 0 be a weak order on one-dimensional subspaces of R 2 that satisfies the condition of lemma 6.1 but not the condition of lemma 6.2. Define 6 on one-dimensional subspaces of R 3 as follows: let p be the northern pole of the unit sphere in R 3 . Let u and v be unit vectors, then ud v either when u ;E and mðuÞR mðvÞ or when u; v 2E and u d 0 v. By lemma 6.13 can be extended to a weak order over R 3 that satisfies the standard assumptions. However, since the condition of lemma 6.2 is not satisfied, 6 cannot be represented via a quantum measure.
Final comments and open problems (a ) Representation and continuity
In Gleason's theorem (1957) , continuity is not assumed and is a consequence of the existence of a frame function. When the primitive of the model is a likelihood order, matters are different. The likelihood order in example 6.3 satisfies de-Finetti's axiom, negation, monotonicity and separability and cannot be represented by a quantum measure. This order, which is not continuous, suggests that continuity must be explicitly assumed and cannot be derived from more plausible assumptions.
The question whether every continuous likelihood order which satisfies de-Finetti's axiom, negation, monotonicity and separability can be represented by a quantum measure is still open.
(b ) Partial representation Definition 7.1. We say that m partially represents 6 if A6 B/ mðAÞ% mðBÞ for every two subspaces A, B of H.
It turns out (we state without a proof) that if 6 satisfies the cancellation condition, then there exists a quantum probability measure that partially represents 6. Also, from the proof of theorem 4.1 it follows that, if there exists a one-dimensional subspace p, such that p wH, then (without assuming separability) 6 admits a partial representation by a pure state.
(c ) Qualitative additivity and discrete orders
Gleason's theorem implies that the only quantum probability measure which obtains a discrete set of values is the uniform measure. The question arises whether the same is true for likelihood orders. We say that 6 is discrete if the restriction of w to one-dimensional subspaces has only finitely many equivalence classes. For instance, if 6 is represented by the uniform probability, then its restriction to one-dimensional subspaces has only one equivalence class.
The Kochen-Specker theorem (1967) actually refers to likelihood orders whose restriction to one-dimensional subspaces have precisely two equivalence classes. In order to prove this result using likelihood orders terms only, one needs to strengthen de-Finetti's axiom and negation. The following axiom is a consequence of de-Finetti's axiom in the classical case, but not in the quantum set-up.
Qualitative additivity. Let A 1 ; A 2 ; B 1 ; B 2 be linear subspaces of H such that A 1 tA 2 and B 1 tB 2 . If A i 6 B i , iZ 1; 2 then A 1 4A 2 6 B 1 4B 2 . Furthermore, strict likelihood on one of the former inequalities implies strict likelihood in the latter.
Suppose that A 1 and A 2 are orthogonal and the same for the B i 's. Qualitative additivity states that, if the A i 's are at least as likely as B i 's, then the subspace spanned by the A i 's is at least as likely as that spanned by B i 's. That is, adding a more likely subspace to a subspace which is already more likely, cannot make the outcome less likely.
Suppose that 6 is defined over R 3 and there are only two equivalence classes of one-dimensional subspaces, say, green and red. If 6 satisfies qualitative additivity, then in any orthogonal triple there is the same number of green representatives, and moreover, a two-dimensional subspace spanned by unicoloured vectors contains only vectors of the same colour. These are precisely the terms of the Kochen-Specker theorem (1967) . It states that there exists no likelihood order that satisfies qualitative additivity and has precisely two equivalence classes of one-dimensional spaces.
